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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CARLOS MAURICE HEARON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020663-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
jqRXgPtqTTQN ANP NATURE QF PRQQSSDINgg 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
third degree felony. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Where a baggie of methamphetamine residue was found in 
defendant's pocket, did the admission of evidence referencing his 
temporary homelessness, his involvement in an alleged car theft, 
and the fact that his children were in state custody prejudice 
the outcome of his drug possession trial? 
"In general, this [c]ourt will not reverse the trial court's 
ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the court 
so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted." State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 
1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is dispositive 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with a single count of 
possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
third degree felony (R. 1). He was tried by a jury and convicted 
as charged (R. 52, 56-58). The court sentenced him to a 
suspended term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison and 
180 days in jail, with credit for time served and work release. 
In addition, the court ordered 36 months of supervised probation 
and imposed fines and fees (R. 61-63). Defendant filed this 
timely appeal (R. 65) .. 
STATEMENT 9F THE FAQTS 
In December of 2001, Officer Pickrell was looking for 
defendant so that he could talk with him about "an incident 
involving a 1989 Ford Mustang" (R. 74: 12). Therefore, when the 
Ogden police dispatch learned of defendant's whereabouts, it 
requested that a nearby officer stop and detain defendant so that 
Officer Pickrell could speak with him (Id. at 14, 37). 
Pickrell arrived on the scene, read defendant his Miranda 
rights, and began asking him about the matter under investigation 
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(Id. at 15)• In the course of the interview, Pickrell ran a 
warrants check on defendant, which revealed that he had an 
outstanding traffic warrant from district court (Id.). The 
officer arrested defendant on the traffic warrant and transported 
him to a secured area of the jail, where defendant was searched 
prior to being booked (Id. at 16-17, 22). In the course of that 
search, Officer Pickrell "found in [defendant's] right front 
pants pocket a small plastic baggie with white residue" (Id. at 
23). When asked what it was, defendant said that "it looked like 
meth, but it was not his" (Id.). The residue was tested and 
confirmed to be methamphetamine (Id. at 59). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that he was prejudiced by the admission of 
testimony about his temporary homelessness, the fact that his 
children were in state custody, and his alleged involvement in a 
car theft. Although this testimony was not directly relevant to 
his culpability for possession of a controlled substance, it did 
not prejudice the outcome of his trial. That is, even if none of 
the testimony to which defendant objects had come in, the results 
of defendant's trial would not have been different. Defendant 
was not convicted of possession of a controlled substance because 
he was temporarily homeless, because his children were in state 
custody, or because of any involvement in a car theft. He was 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance because the 
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police found methamphetamine in his right front pants pocket, and 
the only evidence suggesting he did not know it was there was the 
self-serving testimony of his wife, whom the jury chose not to 
believe. For this reason, his conviction should be affirmed. 
AfiWMEWT 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
REFERENCING DEFENDANT'S TEMPORARY 
HOMELESSNESS, HIS INVOLVEMENT IN AN 
ALLEGED CAR THEFT, AND THE FACT 
THAT HIS CHILDREN WERE IN STATE 
CUSTODY DID NOT PREJUDICE THE 
OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL FOR POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence that defendant was transient, that his children had been 
removed from his home by the State, and that he was involved in a 
car theft (Br. of App. at 10-11). He contends that such evidence 
did nothing to "assist the jury in deciding any element of the 
offense [charged]'' (Id. at 14). He further asserts that the 
evidence of his intent to commit the charged crime was so weak 
that the prosecutor intentionally resorted to such evidence in 
order to bias the jury against him (Id. at 16). 
A. Hon*l*ssn#»a 
The evidence of defendant's homelessness came in during the 
following exchangef while defendant's wife was testifying on his 
behalf: 
The State: Now, you and [defendant] weren't the renters 
of the Stonehedge Apartments, were you? 
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Witness: No, uh-uh. 
The State: And, in fact, wasn't [defendant] essentially 
transient or homeless at the time? 
DefCo: Your Honor, I'm going to further object. 
That's irrelevant, too. 
The Court: Well, I don't know what the materiality is. 
Come on, approach*. 
[off-the-record discussion at the bench.] 
The State: Isn't it true that he was essentially 
transient, homeless? 
Witness: We - yeah, we were in between apartments at 
that time. 
(R. 74 at 70). 
Defendant's objection plainly focused on relevance, a 
rationale that the trial court, for reasons left unexplained, 
rejected. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant urges this Court to 
determine that the evidence was inadmissible on two other bases. 
First, he contends that admission of the homelessness evidence 
violated rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.1 
See Br. of App. at 12-15. And second, defendant contends that 
1
 To prevail' on a 404(b) claim, defendant must demonstrate 
that the evidence failed to demonstrate a "non-character 
purpose." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). That is, relevant evidence will 
be admissible unless its purpose is "to show merely the general 
disposition of the defendant." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 
546 (Utah 1983). Additionally, under rule 403, defendant would 
have to show that the evidence had NVan unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1221-22. 
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the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting 
evidence of his temporary homelessness.2 See Br. of App. at 18-
23• For defendant to prevail on either of these unpreserved 
grounds, he must carry the burden of showing plain error: that an 
error occurred; that it should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and that, absent the error, defendant would have enjoyed 
the likelihood of a more favorable trial outcome. State v, Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)- Defendant can thus only 
prevail on his plain error claims if he can establish that he was 
prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Id.; see also Utah 
R. Evid. 103(d); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
Defendant has failed to make the required showing. In this^  
case, the crime charged was possession of a controlled substance 
and, in defendant's own words, "the only real issue was the intent 
or knowledge of the defendant regarding the drug possession" (Br. of 
App. at 10). Arguably, defendant's homelessness did not add to the 
evidentiary picture relevant to defendant's knowledge of the drugs 
in his pocket. Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo both that the 
prosecutor should not have called the jury's attention to it and 
that the testimony had no proper 404(b) purpose, the testimony was 
2
 To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, defendant 
must demonstrate that the prosecutor called to the attention of 
the jury matters that it was not justified in considering and 
that the jury likely was influenced by the remarks in reaching 
its verdict. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1932) 
(citing State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)). 
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not the sort of evidence that would prejudice a jury against him. 
See, e.g.. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991)(noting that 
when proof of defendant's guilt is strong, challenged conduct or 
remarks in deliberate prosecutorial misconduct claim will not be 
presumed prejudicial)(citation omitted); State v. Featherson, 781 
P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (articulating higher standard pursuant to 
rule 403, where only unfairly prejudicial testimony is inadmissible, 
such as evidence that would inflame a jury or rouse it to 
overwhelming hostility towards defendant)(emphasis added). 
Here, the drug residue was found in defendant's right front 
pants pocket. Further, the only evidence offered to refute 
defendant's knowledge of the contents of his own pocket was his 
wife's detailed and self-serving testimony that she hadn't 
discovered any drugs when she searched his pockets earlier in the 
day and that she was with him from the time he got dressed until the 
time the police stopped him (R. 74: 23, 65-67). Notably, there was 
no testimony suggesting how the drugs might have come innocently 
into defendant's possession. 
Where defendant has not established any likelihood that the 
brief testimony about homelessness had any bearing on the outcome of 
the trial or that, without it, the jury's verdict would be 
different, his argument necessarily fails. 
B. DCFS Custody of Defendant's Children 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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admitting, over his relevance objection, evidence that his children 
were in state custody (Br. of App. at 11-12). He also asserts once 
again, pursuant to the plain error doctrine, that the trial court 
violated rules 404(b) and 403 by admitting the evidence and that the 
State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by mentioning and 
eliciting the testimony (Id, at 12-14, 21-23). 
The matter at issue here came up not during the State's case, 
but during defendant's case, while defense counsel was questioning 
his only witness, defendant's wife. Explaining the chronology that 
led to defendant's arrest, beginning with her searching defendant's 
pants pockets for money before he got dressed in the morning, she 
testified as follows: 
Witness: He put on those pants and his shirt and his 
shoes and socks and we got in the car and 
went to - to the DCFS there. 
DefCo: Okay. When you got there, did anything 
unusual happen after you were there? 
Witness: Yeah. 
DefCo: What happened? 
Witness: Well, the first thing I noticed was a 
friend of ours named Richard-Bard had come 
in DCFS, and the next thing - I think it 
was my son that said that he seen some 
police officers out - outside of the 
building and everything and -
DefCo: Where was [defendant] then? 
Witness: He was right there with the kids and I and 
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DefCo: Okay. Did you sometime later - after that 
go outside? 
Witness: I didn't. He did. In fact, I had a visit 
with our kids so I - they ended up taking 
the kids and I back, you know, in the back 
so the kids, you know, couldn't really see 
too much. But - so we went in the back -
off one of the back offices [sic] at DCFS. 
(R. 74: 67-68). After defendant's own witness opened the door to 
the subject of the DCFS visit, the State then followed up on cross-
examination by asking, "Why was the reason [sic] for the trip to 
DCFS?" (Id. at 69). The witness responded, "To have a visit with 
our children" (Id.). The State next asked, "Where were they?" and 
the witness responded, "They were - they were in State's custody" 
(Id.). At this juncture, defendant objected on relevance grounds, 
and the trial court sustained the objection (Id. at 70). 
The record thus plainly demonstrates that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence over defendant's 
objection.3 Indeed, when defendant entered a timely and specific 
objection to the testiictony, the trial court sustained the objection, 
thus excluding the testimony from the jury's consideration and 
granting defendant the remedy he sought. In addition, the court 
3
 Defendant states that the trial court later "overruled 
the defense objection allowing the prosecutor to comment on this 
issue" [i.e. that the children were in state custody]. See Br. 
of App. at 12 n.2. That objection, however, went not to the 
children being in state custody, but to the prosecutor's 
observation that the witness had a better memory for details 
about defendant's activities than about the visit with her 
children, about which one would think a parent would be 
preoccupied (R. 74: 91-92). 
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clearly instructed the jury that "[y]ou are not to consider evidence 
offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the 
court" (R. 35). Finally, defendant's own witness opened the door to 
the testimony, which did nothing more than make explicit what that 
witness had already plainly implied. 
Under these circumstances, where the court sustained 
defendant's objection and gave a related jury instruction, no abuse 
of discretion occurred. In any event, nothing about defendant's 
children being in state custody would have caused the jury to ignore 
the fact that defendant had methamphetamine residue in his pocket. 
Even if the jury had not heard the testimony, a reasonable 
probability of a more favorable trial outcome for defendant was 
unlikely. Consequently, defendant's argument necessarily fails. 
C. The Alleged Car Theft 
Defendant asserts, with little supporting argument or law, 
that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the 
prosecutor to either reference or elicit from witnesses references 
about defendant's involvement in an alleged car theft4 (Br. of App. 
at 16-18). He also asserts, pursuant to the plain error doctrine, 
that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct both in its 
opening and closing arguments and in its questions to witnesses (Id. 
at 21-23). To prevail on either of these claims, defendant must 
4
 Nowhere, however, does defendant specifically articulate 
on what basis these references constitute error. 
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once again carry his burden of demonstrating that the alleged errors 
harmed him; that, without the evidence, he would have enjoyed the 
reasonable likelihood of a better trial outcome. See, e.g., Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error); Creviston. 646 P.2d at 754 
(prosecutorial misconduct). 
As to the prosecutor, a close examination of the record reveals 
that he was scrupulously careful in his opening and closing 
statements and committed no error. Setting the scene by putting the 
facts in context, the prosecutor began by simply explaining: 
Now, [the officer] wanted to talk with the 
defendant here. . . because his name had come up 
as somebody who may have some information about 
this stolen vehicle. Lest you be distracted by 
that or confused by that, the defendant hasn't 
been charged with that theft. But [the 
detective] wanted to talk with him about this 
'89 Ford Mustang. 
(R. 74: 6). The prosecutor then continued his chronology, 
explaining how events evolved to the point where defendant was 
discovered to have methamphetamine in his pocket (Id. at 6-10). The 
prosecutor introduced reference to the car theft, then, to fill in 
facts necessary for the jury to understand why the police came into 
contact with defendant. See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 
n.4 (Utah App. 1991)(entitling prosecutor to paint factual picture 
of context in which events in question transpired); State v. Pierce, 
722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986)(admitting evidence showing general 
circumstances surrounding a crime). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor referenced the discovery of 
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the methamphetamine in this case as "an incidental discovery," using 
that term to explain that the discovery of the drugs was a byproduct 
of a stop made in an unrelated investigation of "this dispute about 
the 1989 Ford Mustang report of auto theft" (Id^  at 82, 83). In his 
rebuttal, referring to the testimony of the wife, he stated, "And 
let's see what we can infer about her testimony there. They don't 
park at the DCFS building; they park a block and a half, two blocks 
away at least" (Id, at 91). Notably, however, he drew no inferences 
from this statement and went on to other matters. The prosecutor 
made no other mention of the car investigation, properly focusing 
its closing argument on defendant's mens rea in possessing the drug 
and on the incredible aspects of his wife's testimony (Id. at 81-82, 
90-92). 
As to the prosecutor's questioning of witnesses, the matter of 
the car theft came up during the testimony of three witnesses. The 
first witness to testify for the State was Officer Pickrell, who, in 
the routine course of defining his job assignment, stated that he 
was currently working "major crimes, primarily auto thefts" (Id. at 
11). In this context, he was looking for defendant to talk with him 
about "an incident involving a 1989 Ford Mustang dispute" (Id. at 
12). He testified that, after locating defendant, he "gave him 
Miranda and asked him some questions concerning the "89 Mustang" 
(Id. at 15). Officer Pickrell said nothing else about the vehicle 
and never identified defendant as a suspect. 
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The second witness was Officer Draper, who stopped defendant on 
the street and detained him until Officer Pickrell arrived (£d. at 
37). He referred to receiving "a report of a possible suspect" in a 
case Officer Pickrell was investigating (Id.). He testified that he 
told defendant, "you match the description in this case and another 
officer needs to talk to you" (Id.). Later in his testimony, 
seeking to explain his minimal level of involvement in the case, 
Officer Draper stated, "It was Officer Pickrell's case. So I got 
there, detained the suspect" (Id. at 39). Later, he drove to the 
location where the Mustang was parked and stayed there until it was 
picked up (Id. at 39, 41). Officer Draper said nothing more about 
the investigation. 
The car theft was next mentioned when defendant's wife 
testified on his behalf. On cross-examination, in response to the 
prosecutor's observation that the witness and defendant had chosen 
to park their car some distance from the building to which they were 
going, the witness volunteered that "the car had already been stolen 
once" (Id- at 78). This remark opened the door to the following 
exchange: 
The State: In fact, the vehicle was registered to 
someone else. 
Witness: No, it wasn't. It was registered to 
[defendant]. 
The State: In fact, the title was held by somebody 
else, wasn't it? 
Witness: No, it wasn't. It was held by him. 
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DefCo: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
Witness: Till they stole it the first time and took 
it. 
DefCo: This is irrelevant. 
The Court: Approach, please. 
[Off-the-record discussion at the bench] 
The State: I don't have any other questions of this 
witness. 
(Id. at 78). Defendant's wife, in her sua sponte remark about the 
car having been stolen, opened the door to the prosecutor's line of 
impeaching questions, which the trial court seems to have ruled were 
not relevant to the charged crime. The law is well-settled, 
however, that admission of irrelevant evidence will only result in 
reversal if defendant is prejudiced by the admission. See, e.g., 
State v. Blubauqh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App.)(admission of 
irrelevant evidence, although an abuse of discretion, was 
nonetheless harmless), cert, denied, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah 1995). 
Here, any improper questioning by the State was more than 
overshadowed by defense counsel's own remarks during his closing 
statement. Apparently choosing as a matter of trial strategy to 
defuse defendant's wife's testimony by explaining it further, 
defense counsel's closing argument so overemphasized defendant's 
involvement in the unrelated car theft case that any previous 
mention of it by the State was rendered de minimis by comparison. 
Defense counsel effectively drew the jury's attention directly to 
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the car theft and kept it there. Just six sentences into closing, 
counsel stressed: 
Now, [defendant] was a suspect in a car theft, a 
car that he had possession of on the 12th - 6th 
day of December of last year. He admitted to 
the officer he had the car. He said, I own it. 
It's my car. I didn't steal it. But he gets 
arrested, and the other person gets the car. 
Officer Pickrell releases the car to the other 
person. Well, [defendant] says it's my car. 
Six months later he has not been charged with 
car theft. I would suggest that's clear 
evidence that they do not have any sufficient 
evidence to even charge [defendant] with car 
theft. So - but he didn't - but they turned the 
car over to the other person. He's not arrested 
on the car theft. He's arrested - but that - a 
felony, he's not arrested on. He's arrested on 
a warrant for a traffic offense. 
(Id. at 85). Later in closing, defense counsel once again 
emphasized his client's central role in the car theft by declaring 
unequivocally, "Detective Pickrell is assigned to the major crimes 
unit. He's investigating a car theft. [Defendant] is the suspect" 
(Id. at 86). Thus, through repetition, defense counsel ensured that 
the jury clearly understood that defendant was the prime suspect in 
the unrelated car theft case, a fact the State had carefully avoided 
throughout the trial* Any intimation of bad character arising out 
of defendant's association with the car theft, then, is directly 
attributable to defense counsel's own bold characterization of the 
facts. Where defendant himself thus invited the error of which he 
now complains, he cannot prevail on appeal under the plain error 
doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 
15 
1997)(plain error review does not lie when a party, through counsel, 
has led the trial court into error). 
In any event, defendant has failed to show how the prosecutor's 
questions, as distinct from his own emphasis on the testimony to 
which he objects, prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Moreover, he 
ignores the uncontroverted fact that methamphetamine residue was 
found in his pants pocket with no innocent explanation about how it 
got there. Thus, even if the jury had heard nothing about the car 
theft, it would still have convicted defendant of possession of a 
controlled substance. 
Defendant was not convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance because he was temporarily homeless, because his children 
were in state custody, or because he was somehow involved in a car 
theft. He was convicted because the evidence plainly demonstrated 
that he knowingly possessed methamphetamine. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm his conviction for possession or use of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2>L day o f December, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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